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2Introduction.  In his Liberalism against Populism, an interpretation of the results
of social choice theory, Riker (1982) makes an apparently powerful case against the very
intelligibility of majoritarian democracy.  Because different voting systems yield
different outcomes from the same profile of individual voters' preferences, he argues,
democracy is inaccurate.  The claim is made by way of examples that establish logical
possibility.  However, for real-world distributions of individual preference orders –
individual orderings are at least mildly correlated with one another rather than random –
the reasonable voting rules tend to converge on the same outcomes (Mackie 2000).
Next, Riker continues, given a fixed voting system, then democracy is
meaningless:  the outcome of voting is manipulable, and it is not possible to distinguish
manipulated from unmanipulated outcomes because of the unknowability of private
intentions underlying public actions.  I criticize  Riker’s doctrines concerning  the
knowability of other minds in Mackie (1998), expand on that in Mackie (2000), and shall
not repeat those arguments here.
The spirit of Riker’s meaninglessness argument is most simply conveyed by
presenting Condorcet's paradox of voting.  Suppose that there are three persons, 1, 2, and
3, deciding by majority vote among three alternatives A, B, and C, and that individual
preference orders are as displayed in Table 1.
Table 1.  Condorcet Paradox of Voting
1 2 3
A
B
C
B
C
A
C
A
B
As most political scientists know, with that particular profile of individuals' preferences,
alternative A has a majority of votes against B, B a majority against C, and C a majority
against A, so that no alternative beats all others, and "collective preference" cycles
meaninglessly from one alternative to the next.  The Condorcet paradox of voting is a
special case of the Arrow possibility theorem; the Arrow theorem shows more generally
that, assuming all logically possible individual orderings over alternative social states, no
method of aggregating individuals' transitive preference orderings guarantees a collective
preference ordering that is transitive.  Therefore, even the same method of aggregating
individuals' fixed choices may yield different group choices, as the choice arbitrarily or
manipulatively cycles from one alternative to the next.  Associated with the possibility of
cycling are the possibilities of unfairly manipulating the outcome by means of strategic
voting, agenda control, and introduction of new alternatives or dimensions to the issue
space.  Riker’s central hypothesis is that democratic voting is in pervasive disequilibrium.
His liberal interpretation of voting accepts that democratic voting and discussion
are inaccurate and meaningless.  The only democracy that withstands the scrutiny of
“modern political science” (Riker and Weingast 1988, 396) is the liberal institution of
3regular elections that permits both the rejection of tyrannical rulers and the
“circulation of leadership” (1982, 253), preferably supplemented by the liberal
constraints of divided government.
The kind of democracy that thus survives is not, however, popular rule, but rather an
intermittent, sometimes random, even perverse, popular veto.  Social choice theory
forces us to recognize that the people cannot rule as a corporate body in the way that
populists suppose.  Instead, officials rule, and they do not represent some indefinable
popular will.  (Riker  1982, 244)
I cannot adequately discuss Riker’s influential theory in a single paper.  Here, I will
concentrate on Riker’s cycling claims, particularly those related to the U.S. Civil War, as
they are the most celebrated element in his attack on democratic governance.
In a review article on the subject of cycling, Enelow (1997) writes that, “cycling
and majority rule is one of the most heavily researched areas of public choice” (149), yet,
citing only Riker, he acknowledges that “basically, the empirical literature testing the
theory we have described consists of a small set of examples” (160).  There are also some
studies that look at the frequency of cycles in unbiased samples of votes or attitudes:
they show that cycles are rare and trivial.  If I succeed in showing that Riker’s examples
of grand manipulation are mistaken, then the hypothesis of pervasive political
disequilibrium must die from lack of evidence.
Frequency Studies.  In Mackie (2000) I collect and summarize all articles I could
locate in the political science literature that estimate the frequency of cycles from a
proper sample or universe of votes or attitudes.  In order to calculate the frequency of
cycles one needs voters’ rankings over all candidates in an election, such information is
not usually collected, and thus there are few such papers.  Chamberlin, Cohen and
Coombs (1984) found no cycles in five different presidential elections of the American
Psychological Association (APA).  Niemi and Wright (1987) looked at thermometer
ratings (respondents rate 0 to 100 when 0 means very unfavorable and 100 very
favorable) of 14 politicians who were potential or actual candidates for the 1980
American presidential election, from a nationally representative sample of U.S. voters,
and found that the probabilities of cycles were 0.04 or less.  Some very good data from
candidate elections in private organizations in Great Britain were analyzed by Feld and
Grofman (1992).  Only 0.5 (one-half of one) percent of the linearly ordered triples in the
sample universe were cyclic; 24 of the 36 elections had no cycles whatsoever, the largest
percentage of cycles in any election was 2.0 percent; and almost all cycles were among
alternatives adjacent in Borda scores (meaning that they were among close alternatives).
Radcliff (1993) reports high unidimensionality derived from studies of American
presidential elections from 1972 to 1984:  77 to 85 percent single-peakedness in years
with three major candidates in the primary and general elections (at 75 percent
unidimensionality the expectation of a cycle is less than one percent, and at 80 percent
the expectation is almost zero, Radcliff 1994); and 50 percent in 1980 when there were
five major candidates. Van Deemen and Vergunst (1998) continue the elusive quest for
the empirical cycle.  From the Dutch parliamentary election studies of 1982 (13 parties),
41986 (12 parties), 1989 (9 parties), and 1994 (9 parties) they have survey data on
respondents’ preferences over the alternatives.  If preference rankings were random then
there would be about a 50 percent chance of cycles.  There are, however, no cycles in
their data, not anywhere in the rankings, not in any of the elections.
Riker later (1990b, 179) granted that, “Poole and Rosenthal . . . have shown with
large empirical studies of congressional voting that, in the absence of grand manipulation,
a considerable part of political life is unidimensional.”  Poole and Rosenthal (1997)
dedicate their book to Riker, their “teacher, friend, and colleague.”  Their spatial analysis
of all roll-call votes in the 1st through 100th Congresses of the United States shows that
about 85 percent of all votes can be accounted for in two dimensions.  Moreover, “Except
for two periods of American history, when race was prominent on the agenda, whenever
voting could be captured by the spatial model, a one-dimensional model does all the
work” (227).  The first and overwhelmingly important dimension is what we popularly
understand as the standard left-right dimension.  The second dimension explains only
about two percent of the 85 percent captured.  The second dimension varies from
Congress to Congress, and varies from public works to currency to tariffs and other
issues; but was most salient as slavery in the period before the Civil War (the 37th
Congress in 1850 most poorly fit the spatial model) and as race relations in the civil
rights era of the 1950s and ‘60s.  Testing for third, fourth, and greater dimensions on the
whole does not explain meaningfully more than the two-dimensional model.  Since the
mid-1970s, the Congress has become increasingly and is now almost wholly
unidimensional (Poole and Rosenthal 1999).  A unidimensional issue space implies no
cycles; and the mostly unidimensional issue space discovered by Poole and Rosenthal
implies almost no cycles.
Originally, I suspected that this unidimensionality was somehow a product of the
American two-party system and thus not evidence for a strong tendency to
unidimensionality in politics.  The Poole-Rosenthal (1999) methods, however, have
recently been applied to votes in the European Parliament (1989-1997), the British
Parliament (1841), the French National Assembly (1951-1956), the Czech Parliament
(1993-1997), the Polish Parliament (1995), and the United Nations General Assembly
(1946-1996).  The percent of votes correctly classified by a single dimension of analysis
ranges from 85.9 in the U.N. (1954-1969) to 94.2 in the Czech Parliament.  The Czech
Parliament is a multiparty system, and the United Nations comprises the diverse interests
of six billion people.  It is possible that the apparent unidimensionality is an artifact of the
Poole-Rosenthal methodology.
Budge (1993) and coworkers examined all party manifestoes or platforms from
1945 to 1981 in 23 democratic countries and applied factor analysis.  They found that one
dimension, the standard left-right dimension, best explained the data.  After reporting the
findings of Poole and Rosenthal and of Budge, Riker (1993, 4) acknowledged that “issue
spaces tend to be one-dimensional over time.”  He responded that second dimensions
would be of relevance, presumably with respect to possibilities of manipulation, in the
short run.
5Riker (1982, 122-123) acknowledges there is a tendency to similarity
among preference orders that reduces the likelihood of cycles:  “there is good reason to
believe that debate and discussion do lead to … fundamental similarities of judgment.”
However, the possibility of manipulation increases the likelihood of cycles, he argues.
The net result:  there are few cycles on unimportant issues, but more cycles the more
important the issue is to the manipulators.  More precisely,
quite a wide variety of rather mild agreement about the issue dimension guarantees a
Condorcet winner . . . . not all voters need display the agreement to obtain the
guarantee. . . . agreement about dimensions renders uncontrived cyclical outcomes
quite rare. . . . intransitivities only occasionally render decision my majoritarian
decisions meaningless . . . at least when the subjects for political decision are not
politically important.  When, on the other hand, subjects are politically important
enough to justify the energy and expense of contriving cycles, Arrow’s result is of
great practical significance. . . . on the very most important subjects, cycles may
render social outcomes meaningless.  (Riker 1982 128)
These qualifications are inconsistent with the stridency of much of the rest of his 1982
text, and I suspect that they are a late emendation or revision.
On his own terms, Riker’s claim of meaninglessness stands only on incidents of
grand manipulation.  Even if, as Riker maintains, all cyclical manipulations are difficult
to detect, he must be able to demonstrate some instances from the rich universe of
politics, especially since cycles are supposed to be associated with the most important
issues on which we would have the most information.  Otherwise, his claim would have
nothing but the glory and the shame of an unverifiable proposition.  If there are only a
handful of such incidents, then Riker’s claim that democracy is meaningless fails, and it
utterly fails if the handful do not withstand scrutiny.
If there is a cycle, then a killer amendment can succeed by strategic voting.  Poole
and Rosenthal (1997, 147) “found very few bothersome needles in our haystack of
37,000 roll calls.”  The three instances of successful killer amendments identified in the
political science literature, according to Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 162), are the three
recited by Riker in Liberalism against Populism (1982), known as the Wilmot Proviso,
the Depew-Sutherland Amendment, and the Powell Amendment, and each does have to
do with race, often the second dimension in American politics, they claim.  With almost
50 years of controversy, and strong professional incentives for unveiling grand
manipulations, these are the three that we have from the universe of American
Congressional roll-call votes to support the proposition that democracy is meaningless.  I
am able to show that Riker’s accounts of these three events are mistaken.  The jewel in
the crown of Riker’s examples of grand manipulation (not related to Congressional
rollcalls) is his famous allegation of a cycle in the 1860 American presidential race that
resulted in the arbitrary election of Lincoln and consequently the Civil War.  I will show
that his account of that election is clearly mistaken and that there was no such cycle.
6While it is possible to assert individual instances of cycling in the real
world, we have seen that whenever we have some universe of data from which to judge
the frequency of cycles we find that they are rare and trivial.  Next, we shall see that all
claims of grand manipulation fail to survive scrutiny.
Anecdotal Cycling Claims.  Elsewhere (Mackie 2000), I have shown that every
major claim of cycling and related manipulation made by Riker, and every other
developed and published cycle claim I could locate in the literature, is mistaken in one
way or another.  This work is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2.  Summary of Cycling and Manipulation Claims and Mackie Findings
#, Cite Subject Mackie Finding
1
APSR
1958
Agricultural
Appropriations
No cycle in sincere preferences (Riker recognizes
strategic votes); best alternative won.
2
LAP
APM
Agenda
Experiment,
Flying Club
Asymmetric institutions (in this case agenda control and
information control) yield asymmetric outcomes.
3
LAP
APM
Powell
Amendment
Riker and others allege cycle in 1956 vote; assume
irrational voters.  Votes, debates, and inferences in 1956
and 1957 show that school aid would have failed with or
without Powell’s desegregation amendment.  No cycle;
best alternative won.  Adds to Krehbiel and Rivers.
4
LAP
17th
Amendment
Eleven errors of fact; assumes irrational voters.  No
cycles, not in 1902, not in 1911.  17th amendment
would have failed with or without a voting-rights rider.
Passed in late 1911 due to changed composition of the
Senate.  Confirms conjecture of Green and Shapiro.
5
LAP
Wilmot
Proviso
Cycle alleged among Mexican war appropriations,
antislavery amendment and status quo.  Based on
egregious misreading of Congressional Globe.  No
cycle, best alternative won.
6
LAP
Lincoln
Election
No cycle.  Free soil was primary issue in 1860, and the
further north the more antislavery:  latitude was attitude.
Riker 1982, 230, line 2 mistaken:  many Lincoln voters
ranked Douglas ahead of Bell.  Complemented by
Tabarrok and Lee.  (Douglas was best alternative, not
selected due to antimajoritarian design of electoral
college.)
7
LAP
Antebellum
Period
Eruptions of slavery issue not due to arbitrary
manipulation of multidimensional issue space.
Dimensions highly constrained (Poole and Rosenthal).
Eruptions related to disruption of political balance
7following territorial acquisitions (Weingast).
8
APSR
1984
APM
Morris at the
Con Con
Alleged cycle arises from treating similar alternatives as
identical.  If alternatives properly individuated, then no
cycle.
9
APM
Lincoln at
Freeport
Mistaken details; “magic bullet” interpretation of
Freeport debate now rejected by American historians.
Douglas did face a dilemma, but it was one forced upon
him by the changing preferences of the Northern and
Southern populations, not by Lincoln’s discourse.
10
APM
The Masters Not examined.  Based on fiction.
11
APM
Pliny Shows that agenda control was defeated by strategic
voting:  best alternative won.
12
APM
Vote Trading Not examined.  Trade fairly represented opinion?
13
APM
Abstention Idiosyncratic.
14
APM
Gerrymander Undocumentable.
15
APM
Magnuson Many details mistaken, does not fully understand the
parliamentary situation.  Magnuson’s bill supported by
vast majority; an explicit deal was made to pass
Gravel’s more radical amendment in the Senate, and to
withdraw it in Conference, in order to gain Nixon’s
attention, and exactly that happened.
16
APM
Reed, Cannon Not examined.  Majorities enabled?
17
Blyden
burgh
Internal
Revenue 1932
Repeatedly flawed logic; inconsistently applied
inferences of preference orders.  No cycle, best
alternative won.
18
Bjurulf
and
Niemi
Scandinavian
Parliaments
Hospital
Half of voters absent; evidence of strategic voting; if
only 2 out of 37 voters were strategic then equilibrium
in sincere preferences, and best alternative won.
19
Bjurulf
and
Niemi
Scandinavian
Parliaments
Tel and tel
Claim that  strategic voting led to rejection of best
alternative.  Based, however, on unwarranted
assumption that some voters were irrational.
20
Bjurulf
and
Niemi
Scandinavian
Parliaments
Rifle club
Agenda control countered by creative response such that
best alternative prevailed in long run.
821
Neufel
d, et. al
Muscle Shoals Cycle only apparent and due to bungled strategic voting
that authors recognize; sincere preferences in
equilibrium; best alternative won.
APM = The Art of Political Manipulation (Riker  1986), APSR (1958) = Riker (1958),
APSR (1984) = Riker (1984), Bjurulf and Niemi (1978), Blydenburgh (1971), LAP =
Liberalism against Populism (Riker 1982), Neufeld, et. al (1994)
It’s not possible in this brief space to justify my claimed findings.  I present a
sample, however, dealing with Riker’s accounts of the antebellum period (prior to the
U.S. Civil War).  Abridgements of more extended work in Mackie (2000), on the Wilmot
Proviso, on the election of Lincoln, and on antebellum politics generally, follow.
The Wilmot Proviso.  In 1846 President Polk requested an emergency
appropriation in effect to commence the acquisition of the northern half of Mexico.  The
Wilmot Proviso was an amendment moved by Northern Democrats in the House of
Representatives to prohibit slavery in the lands to be acquired from Mexico.  Riker’s
primary claim of disequilibrium is that there was a cycle among legislators’ preferences
on the status quo, the acquisition appropriation, and the appropriation proposal with the
antislavery amendment.  The problem with Riker’s claim is that he misreads the vote in
the congressional record.  A corrected reading shows that there was no cycle.
Northern Democrats were annoyed by the Southern tilt of the Democratic
President Polk, says Riker, and opportunistically reintroduced the slavery issue into
national politics.  The motives of the Northern Democrats are evidenced by Polk’s diary:
this “remarkably astute observer, intimately acquainted with events and personalities
honestly assessed the slavery issue as opportunism on both sides,” Riker continues (1982,
224).  Wilmot did not care about slavery, he only wanted to protect free labor from slave
competition, and the Wilmot Proviso was devised to protect the Northern Democrats
against Whig agitation on the slavery issue, according to Riker.  The Mexican war was
underway, and Polk sought a special two million dollar appropriation in order to bribe the
Mexican army to accept a war settlement favorable to American interests.  Wilmot
moved as an amendment to Polk’s appropriation a provision prohibiting slavery in any
territory acquired from Mexico.  Almost all Northerners voted for the proviso and almost
all Southerners voted against it, whether Whig or Democrat.  The Whigs, by the way,
were the more commercial party, and the Democrats were the more agrarian party, and
both parties were bisectional.  The outcome involved disequilibrium, says Riker.
There are three alternatives under consideration:
OA, the Original Appropriation proposed by Polk
WP, the original appropriation as amended by the Wilmot Proviso
SQ, the Status Quo, no appropriation
9First, according to Riker, by revealed vote a majority in the House ranked
WP > OA.  The Wilmot amendment to Polk’s appropriation carried.  This conclusion is
correct (but Riker’s warrant is not, we shall see).  Second, OA > SQ, by inference, says
Riker:  it’s reasonable that the Democrats, a majority in the House, would support their
President Polk’s request.  This conclusion is correct.  In the August 8, 1846 deliberations
leading up to the Wilmot Proviso several motions to table OA failed; and in a clean vote
on OA’ without any Wilmot Proviso on March 3, 1847, OA’  > SQ by a recorded vote of
115 for, all but two of those for Democrats, to 82 against including only ten Democrats
(Congressional Globe, March 3, 1847, 573; Voteview, 29th House Roll-Call #637).
Third, by inference, says Riker, SQ > WP:  a coalition of first, all southerners,
Democratic or Whig, would oppose WP because it contained the prohibition of slavery,
and second, the northern Whigs would oppose WP because it contained an appropriation
for a war that the Whig Party opposed.  We have WP > OA, OA > SQ, and SQ > WP, or
WP > OA > SQ > WP, a cycle.
Riker further estimates the ranking of the three alternatives by each of eight
natural factions in the House, which taken together again confirms the cycle, he says.
The ranking estimates, however, are pure fantasy, because Riker’s inference that SQ >
WP is directly contradicted by the revealed votes in the record.  Riker wrongly believes
that the vote he reports of 79 ayes and 93 nays was on adopting the amendment to the
original appropriation, WP > OA (“Display 9-1, “The Vote on the Motion to Lay on the
Table the Motion to Engross the Wilmot Proviso,” 1982, 226).  In fact, the vote that he
refers to was on passing the amended appropriation, WP > SQ.  There is no doubt that
Riker’s estimates of rankings of the eight natural factions is based on mistakenly reading
WP > OA for WP > SQ.  His listing of the factions’ rankings (227) clearly builds from his
Display 9-1 of the misinterpreted vote.  The Display asserts that 93 legislators ranked WP
> OA and 79 ranked OA > WP, when in fact 93 legislators ranked WP > SQ and 79
ranked SQ > WP.  The estimates assert, for example, that seven Northern administration
Democrats rank OA > WP and 51 Northern Free Soil Democrats rank WP > OA, when in
fact the vote he references would have his seven Northern Democrats voting SQ > WP
and his 51 Northern Democrats voting WP > SQ.
If it is shown by five revealed votes that WP > SQ, then, I submit, a weakly
warranted inference that SQ > WP must be mistaken.  If we correct Riker’s error we have
WP > OA, OA > SQ, and WP > SQ, or WP > OA > SQ, and no cycle whatsoever.
Table 3. Datum And Warrant, Wilmot Proviso
Riker R. Warrant Mackie M. Warrant
WP > OA Revealed Vote
“Motion to Lay on the
Table the Motion to
Engross the Wilmot
Proviso,” 8 August 1846*
WP > OA Revealed Vote
Two voice votes, 8
August 1846; one
recorded vote, 15
February 1847.
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OA > SQ Inference
“All Democrats, 60% of
the House, supported the
administration on the war”
OA > SQ Revealed Vote
Three recorded votes, 8
August 1846; one
recorded vote, 3 March
1847.
SQ > WP Inference
All southerners, D or W,
opposed the WP, and
Northern Whigs opposed
the war
WP > SQ Revealed Vote
Three recorded votes, 8
August 1846; two
recorded votes, 15
February 1847.
Full Rank WP > OA > SQ > WP WP > OA > SQ
*Riker’s claim of WP > OA is correct, but his warrant is not.  He erroneously believes
that the vote he cites is on WP > OA, when in fact it is on WP > SQ.
Yes, the great cycle that initiated the disequilibrium that culminated in the Civil
War is all based on a simple misreading of the record.  The vote he reports is not on
tabling engrossment of the Wilmot Proviso (WP > OA) but is on tabling engrossment of
the Wilmot-amended appropriation (WP >SQ).  Riker (1982, 290) cites to Congressional
Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 1218.  He says (225) that the Wilmot Proviso was
voted on eight times on August 8, 1846, but the largest and crucial vote was on a motion
to lay on the table a motion to engross, which was defeated by 79 to 93.  There is not any
motion to engross nor any vote resembling 79 ayes to 93 nays on page 1218 of the record.
There is a vote to table engrossment on page 1217 of the record, with 78 ayes and 93
noes (Voteview 29th House, Roll-Call #456).  Quite clearly this vote is on the whole bill,
as are three further votes with the same effect of endorsing WP > SQ on p. 1218 (one
unrecorded and two recorded, Congressional Globe, August 8, 1846, 1218; Voteview,
29th House, Roll-Calls #457 and #458).  The whole controversy replayed again on
February 15, 1847, when WP > SQ by a vote of 115 to 106 (Congressional Globe, 425;
Voteview, 29th House, Roll-Call #582).  All together that makes five revealed votes
showing that the House of Representatives ranked WP > SQ.
Theoretically, any reader should be able to detect the nonsensical error embodied
in Riker’s claim that SQ > WP even without going back to check the reference to the
records of Congress, yet for twenty years many intelligent people have repeated this story
without reporting the error.  I feel that it is my reluctant duty to report a problem with
public-choice style of explanation.  This style of explanation is often not immediately
intuitive yet is gilded with an abstract formalism that suggests that something important
and believable is being said.  I am not the first to suggest that there is no necessary
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relationship between formalism and profundity, and that it is just as possible
that such models obscure as that they reveal.
The Election of Lincoln.  By way of background, Riker’s overarching hypothesis
is that the slavery dimension of concern was suppressed by the Democratic Party
manipulative elite with the Missouri Compromise of 1820.  The main dimension of
contention between the Democrats and the Whigs, both bisectional parties, was
economic, broadly speaking the Democratic coalition was agrarian and the Whig
coalition was commercial in orientation.  Another manipulative elite, the northern wing
of the Whigs, the weaker party in this period, sought to find an issue that would split the
Democrats and thereby allow the northern Whigs to organize a newly dominant coalition.
The Wilmot proviso in 1846 was their first effort to contrive a cycle, and the election of
Lincoln in 1860 was their last and most successful effort at contriving a cycle.
 In this section we first examine Riker’s analysis of the 1860 presidential election.
Riker estimates the preferences among the population over the four candidates.  These
estimates show both that there was a cycle among the top three candidates and that
different hypothetical voting rules would yield different outcomes.  This is the perfect
illustration of Riker’s contentions that democracy is meaningless and arbitrary and that
manipulation is probable on grand issues.  In Mackie (2000) I relate the histories and the
ideologies of the four parties in the runup to the 1860 election.  The ideologies of the four
parties suggest a unidimensional and noncyclical distribution of preferences, with the
question of slavery in the territories being the primary dimension of dispute in the
election.  County-level, state-level, and region-level aggregates further support the
hypothesis of noncyclicity.  Riker’s demonstration of meaningless and arbitrary outcomes
depends on an unwarranted estimate that Bell, the candidate of the Upper South who
received two percent of the vote in the North, was ranked second by more than 63 percent
of Lincoln voters.  If, as was far more likely, Douglas, the candidate of the Lower North,
was ranked second by more than 37 percent of Lincoln voters, then most voting methods
considered yield the same ranking, and all yield the same winner:  Douglas.
There were four major candidates in the American presidential election of 1860.
They were Abraham Lincoln, the nominee of the six-year old northern political alliance
known as the Republican Party; Stephen A. Douglas, the candidate of the northern wing
of the Democratic Party; John Bell, from the recently formed Constitutional Unionist
Party, an attempt at a conservative centrist coalition with its base in the upper south; and
John C. Breckenridge, Vice President in the outgoing Buchanan administration and
candidate of the renegade southern wing of the Democratic Party.  The election of
Lincoln as president in 1860 was a replay of the disequilibrium of the Wilmot proviso,
says Riker (1982, 228).  Lincoln won by a plurality of about 40 percent, he continues, and
so one must suspect a cycle.  Riker displays 15 of the possible 24 rankings possible for
strong preferences over four candidates and then estimates the total number of voters
across the nation for each of the 15 likely rankings (each ranking total is the sum of
regional subtotals that he does not display).  From the voting data we know only the first-
ranked choices of the voters, so, as Riker explains, his estimation of the rankings over the
remaining three choices in each of the 15 cases is intended as an informed historical
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judgment (he calls them “guesses,” but presumably they are not arbitrary or he
would not have bothered to present them).  Fair enough.  The estimation of full rankings
then permits the calculation of hypothetical outcomes by alternative voting rules.  The
results seem to confirm Riker’s thesis that democracy is arbitrary and meaningless.
Different voting rules lead to different outcomes, and pairwise comparison (the
Condorcet criterion) discloses the presence of a cycle.  Here are Riker’s results:
Plurality:  Lincoln > Douglas > Breckenridge > Bell
Pairwise Comparison:  (Douglas > Lincoln > Bell > Douglas) > Breckenridge
Borda Count:  Douglas > Bell > Lincoln > Breckenridge
Approval Voting (two votes):  Bell > Lincoln > Douglas > Breckenridge
Approval Voting (three votes):  Douglas > Bell > Lincoln > Breckenridge
Riker concludes that with five methods of voting Douglas wins twice, Bell once,
Lincoln once, and they are in a cycle and hence tie once.  “Clearly, if my guesses are
even roughly right, there was complete disequilibrium in 1860” (1982, 229).
Riker’s demonstrations of disequilibria in the Wilmot proviso and in the election
of 1860 are the primary evidence for his influential theory of political disequilibrium and
are widely accepted and repeated in the political science discipline today.  We have seen
that he was in error about the Wilmot proviso and now we shall see that he was in error
about the election of 1860 as well.
His Display 9-2, “Possible Preference Orders in 1860, by Candidate of First
Choice and by Region,” which lists his estimates of full preference rankings for the entire
electorate, is daunting to the reader.  Except for a few words about the regional
breakdown of each ranking in the display itself, there is no textual justification for the
ranking estimates.  They are presented as authoritative, and one could only check them by
deep immersion in the history of the period.  Fortunately, we need not sweat through all
15 rankings to detect the error, because it occurs in the first two rankings he lists.  These
two categories are the estimated full rankings of all those whom we know ranked Lincoln
first.  Moreover, the two rankings contain 40 percent of the voting population of the
entire country, so if there is a major error among them then we need go no further.
Riker’s first group is 450,000 voters who prefer Lincoln > Douglas > Bell >
Breckenridge and they are made up of one-fourth of New England, Mid-Atlantic, and
Midwest Lincoln voters; and all southern Lincoln voters.  The second group is 1,414,000
voters who prefer Lincoln > Bell > Douglas > Breckenridge, and they are made up of
three-fourths of New England, Mid-Atlantic, and Midwest Lincoln voters; and all border
and western Lincoln voters.  The problem is with these two estimates.  The large majority
of Lincoln voters did not rank Bell second, as Riker claims, they ranked Douglas second,
and once we understand this error Riker’s demonstration collapses.
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For ease of exposition, henceforth ignore Riker’s inclusion of southern,
border, and western Lincoln voters in the two rankings under consideration, as they
represent about five percent of his total in the two rankings and don’t change anything in
either his analysis or mine.  Reconstructing Riker’s data, he has it that about 1,794,000
voters in the free north (excluding the northern slave state Missouri, border states, and
Oregon and California in the west) voted for Lincoln, and he is correct enough on that.
His further claim is that of those, one-fourth or about 450,000 ranked Douglas second,
and three-fourths or about 1,346,000 ranked Bell second.  I claim that it is the reverse,
that most, let’s say 60% or more, of Lincoln voters ranked Douglas second, and few, say
40% or less, ranked Bell second.
Mackie (2000) provides historical background to the 1860 election.  The major
controversy in the country was the extent to which slavery would be allowed in the vast
territories, the so-called “free soil” question.  The platforms of the four parties manifest a
monotonic north to south gradation of position on the free soil question, the primary
dimension of dispute in the election.  Lincoln and the Republicans declared all territories
closed to slavery; Douglas and the Northern Democrats held to the compromise doctrine
of popular sovereignty, that each territory would decide the question without federal
direction; Bell and the Constitutional Unionists implicitly considered the territories open
to slavery but a matter for political negotiation; and Breckenridge and the Southern
Democrats declared all territories open to slavery on implicit threat of secession.
Presumably Riker’s inference that Bell was the second choice of most Lincoln
voters was based on the thought that the Constitutional Unionists contained many former
Whigs, and that Whiggish Lincoln voters in the North would go for Whiggish
Constitutional  Unionists rather than for Douglas from their ancient enemy the
Democratic Party.  That did not happen and to understand why we have to pay special
attention to the Constitutional Unionist Party and its platform (Mackie 2000 provides data
on all  party platforms).
The Constitutional Unionists said that platforms are misleading and divisive, and
theirs was brief and basic.  They recognized “no political principle other than the
Constitution of the Country, the Union of the States, and the Enforcement of the Laws”
(emphasis omitted, Morison 1971, 1127).  Their platform sounds platitudinous, and
because of that and their poor showing in the election some commentators neglect to
locate them ideologically.  Who they were and what they did not say is more important
than the little they did say in the platform document.  Here we turn to Dumond’s close
study (1931, 92-96).  The convention did not seek to establish uniformity of opinion on
the free soil question, leaving that to every individual’s judgment.  The party would
scrupulously avoid mention of the tiresome topic of slavery; although its state affiliates
might take particular stands.  Where Douglas sought an ambiguous formulation on the
free-soil question, the Constitutional Unionists sought none.  Their platform pledged
them, however, to “the just rights of the people and of the States reestablished, and the
Government again placed in that condition of justice, fraternity, and equality which,
under the example of the Constitution of our fathers, has solemnly bound every citizen of
the United States . . .” (emphasis added).  Dumond emphasizes that the pledge of union is
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not unconditional, rather, continued union is conditioned on the reestablishment
of states’ rights and equality between the sections as found in the original constitutional
compromise.  It is the original constitutional compact that requires loyalty, not present-
day misinterpretations or usurpations by the north.
Outside the platform, the Constitutional Unionists denounced Douglas’s doctrine
of popular sovereignty, and believed that Congress must protect the property rights of
slaveowners in the territories, the southern position on free soil.  They also denounced the
Breckenridge Democrats for threatening secession; but did not deny the right to secede
should compromise fail.  The practical difference between the two southern factions was
that Breckenridge’s Democrats considered the election of a Republican president
sufficient to justify secession, while Bell’s Constitutional Unionists thought that
resistance would only be justified by an overt act against southern interests by a northern
administration.  The southern former Whigs  who were the largest faction in the
organization of the Constitutional Unionists aspired to attract northern former Whigs, but
they largely failed, because they did not appeal to northern sentiments on free soil.  The
southern orientation of the Constitutional Unionists was no secret to northern voters:  the
Constitutional Unionists received two percent of the vote in the free states, 13 percent of
their vote nationwide.  Riker’s position that three-fourths of Lincoln voters in the north
ranked Bell second is not only undefended, it goes against the evidence.
I maintain that voter preferences in the 1860 election were for the most part
single-peaked and unidimensional.  Riker maintains that the preferences of Lincoln voters
were not single-peaked because they ranked Bell second and Douglas third.  Riker does
not have direct data for his assertion that Lincoln voters ranked Bell second; it is an
inference, and one not defended in his text.  I labor in Mackie (2000) to show that it is
ideologically and geographically implausible that the majority of Lincoln voters ranked
Bell second.  Aggregate data will further support my position.  Anyone can accuse an
inference from an aggregate to its individual members of being an instance of the poorly-
named ecological fallacy.  If the aggregate of first-place votes shows A first, B second,
and C third, that does not necessarily mean that individuals who rank A first rank B
second.  All A-voters could rank C second; from the aggregate data alone we are not
entitled to a certain inference that A-voters rank B second.  If, however, we have
independent evidence that A-voters rank B second, then aggregate data bolster the
conclusion that A-voters rank B second.  The ecological fallacy is not a fallacy, but rather
a logical possibility.  It is a possibility and not an inevitability.  The independent evidence
I present on ideology supports my proposed inference from aggregate rankings to
individual rankings.  Why would a voter in the north choose Lincoln?  High among the
reasons must be Lincoln’s appeal to northern interests including his position on free soil;
otherwise one of the other candidates would do.  If such a voter were denied the choice of
Lincoln, who would his second choice be?  Why not Douglas, who is the next most
adjacent on issues of northern interest?  And if Douglas were not available where next
would the typical northern voter turn?  He would turn to Bell, the candidate of the upper
south, of course, not to Breckenridge the candidate of the deep south.  A zealous critic
could claim that this is not enough; but please notice that my hypothesis – that Douglas
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the candidate of the lower north ranked second among Lincoln voters in the
north rather than Bell the candidate of the upper south – is supported by some evidence,
while Riker’s opposite hypothesis is supported by none.  Riker is attempting to support
his controversial and apparently counter-empirical doctrine of political disequilibrium;
and the burden of proof is on one who would defend his extraordinary claim.
A look at a map of the county-level winners in the 1860 presidential elections
(McPherson 1993, 128) shows that latitude is attitude.  The upper north voted for Lincoln
(more free soil), the lower north voted for Douglas (less free soil), the upper south voted
for Bell (less slave soil), and the lower south voted for Breckenridge (more slave soil).
Nationally, Douglas and Bell did less well than Lincoln and Breckenridge and thus the
east-west swathes of Douglas and Bell in the center are each thin and those of Lincoln
and Breckenridge at the extremes are each thick.  The strongly unidimensional (north to
south) map of first-place county winners supports the hypothesis that preferences were
generally single-peaked.
If voter preferences were ideologically oriented to the free soil question and hence
single-peaked, then we would expect upper northern voters to rank L > D > Bl > Br.
Aggregates at the state level (displays omitted) show that in the north Lincoln was first
everywhere and Douglas generally finished second.  Douglas finished second everywhere
in the north except for in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania.  Bell finished second in
Massachusetts, but that was because the Vice Presidential nominee on the Constitutional
Union ticket was Edward Everett of Massachusetts who got a favorite-son vote in his
home state.  In Pennsylvania, in a last-minute attempt to deny Lincoln a majority in the
electoral college and salvage local campaigns, Douglas and Breckenridge forces formed
an anti-Lincoln fusion candidacy with Breckenridge as the nominal candidate, and even
then stubborn voters continued to vote for Douglas and Bell.  New York had a fusion of
Douglas and Bell forces with electoral-college votes pledged two-thirds to Douglas and
one-third to Bell.  Rhode Island had a fusion ticket under Douglas.  My ideological
prediction that Bell would finish third in the north is not supported:  he finishes third in
three states and fourth in eight states.  This is the candidate that Riker would have us
believe is ranked second by northern Lincoln voters.  Breckenridge often did better than
Bell because he enjoyed organizational support from the outgoing Buchanan machine,
including many of the northern Democratic legislators and most of the local patronage
appointees.  In this region, 55 percent of voters favored Lincoln, 35 percent Douglas,
eight percent Breckenridge, and two percent Bell, L > D > Br > Bl.
The two free western states should follow the northern pattern.  Lincoln finishes
first in both.  In California, Bell finishes fourth.  In Oregon Breckenridge finishes second,
but this is because his vice presidential candidate, Lane, was a senator from Oregon.  For
the lower north on ideological grounds I predict that voters would first support Douglas,
then Lincoln the other northern candidate, then Bell from the upper south, then
Breckenridge from the lower south.  Douglas is first in Missouri, but against the
schematic expectation Lincoln is last in this northern slave state.  In New Jersey there
was an anti-Lincoln fusion candidacy of Douglas, Bell and Breckenridge, under the flag
of Douglas, and Douglas won.  Not showing at the state level of aggregation, and
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connecting Missouri to New Jersey from east to west, are Douglas’s strengths
in southern Illinois, southern Indiana, southern Ohio, and the fusion candidacy under
Breckenridge’s name in Pennsylvania.  In the lower north region, limited to two states,
Douglas obtained 42 percent of the vote, Lincoln 27 percent, Bell 21 percent, and
Breckenridge 11 percent.  For the upper south the ideological prediction is that Bell
would be first, followed by the other southern candidate, Breckenridge, then Douglas,
then Lincoln.  Expectations for the upper south are satisfied in Kentucky, Tennessee, and
Virginia, and are imperfectly satisfied in the states of Delaware and Maryland.  Overall in
the upper south region, Bell received 45 percent of the vote, Breckenridge 43 percent,
Douglas 11 percent, and Lincoln two percent.  South Carolina, true to form, did not let its
citizens vote for president, a choice reserved for the political elite.  Texas had an anti-
Breckenridge fusion slate under the banner of Bell.  The lower south satisfies
expectations.  Overall in the lower south, Breckenridge got 55 percent of the vote, Bell 38
percent, Douglas seven percent, and Lincoln was not on the ballot.  The largest exception
among all regions to the ideological single-peakedness prediction places Bell fourth in
the north rather than in second where Riker needs him to be.
Finally, let’s look at the section-level aggregate of votes.  Riker does not provide
a source for his election data, nor does he explain his calculations, nor is his arithmetic
consistently reliable.  Thus, it is not possible to infer what Riker’s source document was,
and the numbers I use (derived from Burnham’s regional totals, 1955, 246-256) are quite
close (one or two percent) to what can be reconstructed from Riker but are not identical.
There were about 3,450,000 voters in the north (excluding the western states California
and Oregon but including the slave state Missouri).  Of these, 53 percent voted for
Republican Lincoln, 36 percent voted for Northern Democrat Douglas, eight percent
voted for Southern Democrat Breckenridge and four percent voted for Constitutional
Unionist Bell:  L > D > Br > Bl.
After my first analysis of the issue, Tabarrok and Spector (1999) appeared, an
intriguing, useful, and a more technically sophisticated analysis of the 1860 election.
Tabarrok and Spector had Riker’s rankings over the four candidates.  They also queried
100 Civil War historians as to their views on the rankings, and 15 responded with
opinions about the percentage of voters of various rankings over Lincoln, Douglas, Bell,
and Breckenridge.  For voters who ranked Lincoln first, the historians’ median opinion
was that 60% ranked Douglas second and 40% ranked Bell second.  Of the 15 historian
respondents, 12 had a view contrary to Riker’s, each of those 12 believed that 50% or less
of Lincoln voters ranked Bell second.  Two of the three respondents who seem to agree
with Riker’s estimate (that Bell ranked second among more than 63% of Lincoln voters)
are also those who make the most extreme estimate in either direction (90% and above
for Bell).  Tabarrok and Spector constructed a median historian’s profile, and compared it
to Riker’s.  As I said, I believe that many commentators, a number of historians included,
fail to locate the Constitutional Unionists ideologically and geographically, and my
estimate of their support among Lincoln voters would note exceed 10%, however,
nothing in the analysis here depends on my apparently extreme view on the question.
The plane of possible outcomes in Tabarrok and Spector’s positional-vote space, using
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Riker’s profile, is large, and permits a large variety of rankings by way of
varying the weights of a positional voting rule – from plurality to Borda count to
antiplurality and everything in between.  The positional vote plane using the median
historian’s profile is small, and “Douglas wins . . . under any positional voting system
which gives significant weight to second- or second- and third-ranked preferences” (278);
Lincoln wins by plurality count, which gives no weight to any preferences except for the
first-ranked.  Condorcet pairwise comparison is cyclic with Riker’s profile, but with the
median historian’s profile Douglas beats Bell by 15.1%, Bell beats Lincoln by 0.033%
(three-hundredths of one percent), and Lincoln beats Breckenridge by 25.4%.
The ideological data, aggregate data at the county, state, and sectional levels, and
the opinion survey of antebellum historians support the hypotheses that Douglas and not
Bell was second-ranked among Lincoln voters, and that preferences were for the most
part single-peaked across the country.
What does this revision do to Riker’s demonstration that democracy is arbitrary
because different voting methods result in different outcomes and that democracy is
meaningless because cycles will be contrived on major issues such as the future of
slavery?  The first thing we must do is to correct Riker’s original claims.  He claims that
the Borda count ranks D > Bl > L > Br.  This is not correct, the Borda count from his
figures indicates D > L > Bl > Br.  He also states that the “actual” method and outcome
was the plurality ranking L > D > Br > Bl.  That is not quite correct, as the actual
outcome was determined by the electoral college where the ranking was L (majority) >
Br > Bl > D.  Customarily, the electors vote on the instructions of their states and if they
deadlock, then the top three candidates go to the House of Representatives where each
state delegation casts one vote, and if the House deadlocks then the top two candidates go
to the Senate.  It is important to know that this arrangement, and not national-level
plurality rule, was the voting scheme that motivated the candidates’ decisions.  That gives
us a corrected version of Riker’s findings:
Electoral College:  Lincoln (majority) > Breckenridge > Bell > Douglas
Plurality:  Lincoln > Douglas > Breckenridge > Bell
Pairwise Comparison:  (Douglas > Lincoln > Bell > Douglas) > Breckenridge
Borda Count:  Douglas > Lincoln > Bell > Breckenridge
Approval Voting (two votes):  Bell > Lincoln > Douglas > Breckenridge
Approval Voting (three votes):  Douglas > Bell > Lincoln > Breckenridge
Riker has one-fourth of Lincoln voters ranking Douglas second and three-fourths
of Lincoln voters ranking Bell second.  Bell got two percent of the vote in the states
ranking Lincoln first, but let’s be generous and adopt the median historian’s view that
Bell was the second choice of 40 percent of Lincoln voters and that Douglas was the
second choice of 60 percent of Lincoln voters.  What happens then to the arbitrarily
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different outcomes and the meaningless cycle?  They disappear!  A pairwise
comparison matrix is displayed in Table 4.  Riker’s figures are in roman  type.  The cells
showing how many preferred Douglas to Bell, and how many preferred Bell to Douglas,
are revised to reflect my proposed reversal of the proportions of Lincoln voters second-
ranking Douglas and Bell.  My revised totals are in italic.
Table 4.  Pairwise Comparison Matrix, 1860 Election
L D Bl Br Borda
Lincoln 2165 2542 2968 7675
Douglas 2516 2265
-718
+ 1076 =
2623
3658 8439
8797
Bell 2139 2416
+718 –
1076 =
2058
3090 7645
7287
Breck. 1713 1023 1591 4327
Note:  Riker’s estimates in Roman type, Mackie’s revision in italic type.
The consequences are straightforward.  By pairwise comparison, we have D > L,
L > Bl, L > Br, D > Bl, D > Br, Bl > Br; and that reduces to D > L > Bl > Br, which is not
a cycle.  The Borda count is still D > L > Bl > Br.  Approval voting with two votes
changes from what it was to D > L > Bl > Br.  Approval voting with three votes remains
D > Bl > L > Br.  Here is a summary of the finally corrected outcomes.
Pairwise Comparison:  Douglas > Lincoln > Bell > Breckenridge.
Borda Count:  Douglas > Lincoln > Bell > Breckenridge.
Approval Voting (two votes):  Douglas > Lincoln > Bell > Breckenridge.
Approval Voting (three votes):  Douglas > Bell > Lincoln > Breckenridge.
With plurality runoff, Lincoln and Douglas would go to the runoff and Douglas would
win (a runoff between first-round losers Bell and Breckenridge has Bell as the winner,
yielding the overall ranking D > L > Bl > Bk).  All five of these voting methods select
Douglas as the winner.  Except for approval voting with three votes (in this example
equivalent to antiplurality), the rules identify the same ranking D > L > Bl > Bk.  That
antiplurality is an exception is not a surprise, since antiplurality is an even more
inaccurate voting rule than is the plurality rule.  Antiplurality means that everyone votes
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against her least-favored candidate, and it is inaccurate because all other
ranking information is ignored.
The champion of Riker may still have doubts and, all evidence to the contrary,
still insist that many Lincoln voters ranked Bell second.  How sensitive is Riker’s
assertion of a cycle?  He says that 25 percent of Lincoln voters ranked Douglas second
and 75 percent ranked Bell second.  Riker’s cycle assertion is fragile:  if merely 30
percent of Lincoln voters rank Douglas second and 70 percent Bell then Riker’s cycle
vanishes.  How sensitive is the assertion of different outcomes from different voting
rules?  If the second ranking of Lincoln voters is 33 percent for Douglas and 67 percent
for Bell, then that is enough for pairwise comparison, Borda count, approval voting with
two votes, antiplurality, and plurality runoff to pick Douglas as the winner.  If 37 percent
of Lincoln voters ranked Douglas second and 63 percent ranked Bell second, then that is
enough for pairwise comparison, Borda count, approval voting with two votes, and
plurality runoff to converge on the same ranking:  D > L > Bl > Br.  So Riker’s case
depends on the assertion that more than 63 percent of Lincoln voters in the north ranked
Bell, the candidate who had obtained two percent of the votes in the North, second.  That
is too fragile to carry a case for pervasive political disequilibrium, a hypothesis which, as
we have seen, is otherwise unsupported.
But Lincoln won the election, not Douglas! the Rikerian might reply.  In Mackie
2000 I explain why Douglas lost both the plurality vote and the electoral college, and
further, I hypothesize that the tragic outcome arose from strategic miscalculations by the
actors.  With plurality rule, by Duverger’s “law,” we should expect two candidates, not
four.  The voting rule was not pure plurality rule, however, but amalgamation  by state to
the electoral college, and if no majority in the electoral college, then the top three
candidates go to the House where each state has one vote, and if the House deadlocks
effectively the top two candidates go to the Senate.  This bizarre voting rule elicited four
candidacies:   most of Bell’s supporters and many of Breckenridge’s expected to deny a
majority in the electoral college and thereby throw the vote to the House or the Senate
where the south would do better than with the electorate.  A democratic theorist need not
defend the clumsy electoral college, which was hastily designed with antimajoritarian
intent.  A pure plurality rule in the 1860 election would probably have elicited the
candidacies of Douglas and Lincoln (or similar candidates), with Douglas (or otherwise
the more centrist candidate) the victor.  The Rikerian might also reply that the displays in
Tabarrok and Spector (1999), with the more single-peaked median historian’s profile,
still show, albeit to a much lesser extent, that different outcomes might arise from
different voting rules.  That would be to ignore a caution that those authors issue:  “had
the voting system been different, candidate and party strategies would have been
different” (262).  My interpretation under the median historian’s profile is that Douglas
would have won under most positional rules; Lincoln apparently wins under plurality rule
with four candidates but if the election had been pure plurality rule eliciting two
candidates Douglas would have beat Lincoln; or, if we wanted to keep the four
candidates, Douglas would have won a plurality runoff election.
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Riker’s Theory of Dimensional Manipulation. Riker’s account of the
evolution of the slavery issue up to the Civil War is an illustration of his theory of
manipulation and the natural selection of issues.  The survey he hopes will establish the
existence of manipulative agenda control on a grand scale.  The political losers, he
argues, successfully and luckily introduced a new issue or dimension so as to generate
cycles or disequilibrium that they resolved with the Civil War thereby fixing their
coalition as supreme in American politics for several generations.  I accept part of Riker’s
story.  From 1800 to 1860 there was an intersectional coalition of agrarian expansionists
–  Jeffersonian Republicanism and then Jacksonian Democracy – that frequently
controlled the federal government.  There was also a less successful commercial
coalition, first organized as the Federalists, later organized as the intersectional Whig
Party, and finally organized as the Republicans, which constrained the agrarians but less
frequently controlled the federal government.  The commercial party desired high tariffs
to protect industry, the agrarians low tariffs to obtain cheaper imports and promote
exports; the commercial party wanted internal improvements such as canals and railroads,
the agrarian party did not directly benefit from commercial development; and so on.  The
multitude of issues imperfectly dividing the coalitions, and their evolution over time, are
more intriguingly complex than this caricature, but we can’t afford to go into detail here
(see Ashworth 1995, 366-492 for a thick discussion up to 1850).  I also accept that from
1800 to 1860 politics was often organized along two dimensions, a usually stronger
dimension of economic conflict and a usually uncorrelated and much weaker dimension
often involving sectional conflict.
Riker’s argument is that the losing commercialists sought with one or another
issue to split the winning agrarians.  They tried the slavery issue several times and finally
hit the jackpot with it in 1860.  They used their victory in the Civil War to establish a new
institutional equilibrium favorable to their coalition and unfavorable to the losers of that
war.  In Riker’s theory (1982, 200) it is the “skill, energy, and resources” of leaders,
rather than the preferences of the population, that accounts for political change.  For
purposes of the theory it is as if the distribution of preferences were fixed from 1800 to
1860; the engine of change is differences in politicians’ abilities to manipulate the agenda
inside multidimensional issue space.  Why does Riker assign causality to political
leaders?  Because of the episodic nature of the crises over slavery.  Slavery existed for
200 years, and was settled by the constitutional convention for 30 years when the first
crisis, the Missouri controversy, arose in 1819.  No economic factors account for the rise
and fall of the slavery issue in the two years of the Missouri controversy, underlying
sentiments were the same before and after, by elimination that leaves political leadership
as the explanatory variable, according to Riker.  The slavery issue subsided and lay
quiescent until the controversy over the gag rule in the 1830s and then ripened into the
episodic crises of the Wilmot Proviso in 1846, the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, and the
election of Lincoln in 1860.
There is an alternative explanation, however.  Weingast (1998), Riker’s former
student, explains that national crisis erupted whenever the sectional equilibrium in the
Senate was threatened.  For purposes of apportionment of representation in the House and
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the electoral college the South enjoyed a 3/5 vote for every slave owned, it had
an effective sectional veto over selection of the president, it was the majority faction in
the majority party, it was overrepresented on the Supreme Court, and it also enjoyed
blocking power in the Senate.  The U.S. Senate is made up of two Senators from every
state, and from 1792 to 1858 the number of either free or slave states almost never
exceeded one another by more than one; as the country expanded there was a deliberate
effort especially by the south to maintain an equal sectional balance in the Senate
(Weingast 1998, 154).  Antislavery measures often passed the majoritarian House only to
die at the hands of the southern veto in the antimajoritarian Senate (Weingast 1998, 168).
In 1819 it was proposed to admit Missouri as a slave state, raising the question of
whether the remainder of the vast but unsettled Louisiana Territory would be open to
slavery.  Northerners opposed admitting Missouri as a slave state for one reason because
it was well north of the existing slave states; southerners opposed requiring Missouri to
be a free state in part because it was settled by southerners.  The eventual compromise,
passed with many southern and fewer northern votes, was to admit slave Missouri as an
exception above that latitude but otherwise close the remainder of the Louisiana Territory
north of 36 degrees 30 minutes to slavery; also Maine was brought in as a free state to
balance Missouri in the Senate.  The next sectional crisis arose over the Wilmot proviso
starting in 1846, which emerged just as the United States was almost doubling its
territory with the Mexican and Oregon acquisitions.  California was admitted as a free
state in 1850, giving the North an edge of one in the Senate, and under old expectations
the South would be due the admission of a slave state.  Blocked by the Missouri
Compromise, the South had no practical opportunity for the organization of a new slave
state, however.  That is why the Democrats at the height of their power in 1854 passed
the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  The plan was to encourage admission of Kansas as a slave
state (and Nebraska as a free state many years later), but Kansas was north of 36 degrees
30 minutes and could not be organized as a slave state unless the Missouri Compromise
was repealed.  Thus, another crisis.  Minnesota and Oregon were admitted as free states
in 1858 and 1859 respectively, making for an imbalance of 18 free states and 15 slave
states in the Senate.  By 1860 the South had lost not only the Senate, but the Presidency,
and then came the Civil War.  Yes, there is a political explanation for the succession of
episodic slavery crises, but it is the threat to sectional equilibrium in the Senate, not as
Riker would have it the arbitrarily variable activation of dimensions by political
operators.
Poole and Rosenthal (1997), also Riker’s students, set out to measure the
dimensionality of all roll-call votes in the U.S. Congress.  As we have seen, they found
that for all such votes, 83 percent are explained by one dimension and another two
percent are explained by a second dimension.  The first dimension usually captures party
loyalty and the second dimension usually differentiates the members by region within
each party (46-51).  Before the rise of the second, Democrat and Whig, party system in
the middle 1830s the second dimension frequently involved public works.  From 1837
through 1850 the second dimension frequently involved slavery or public lands.  The
Congress of 1851 and 1852, after the Compromise of 1850, is spatially chaotic,
completely disorganized in dimensional terms.  By the Congress of 1853 and 1854
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slavery had become the first dimension of politics and remained so into the
Civil War.  Furthermore, the major vehicle for realignment in the antebellum period was
replacement of legislators, not changes in legislators’ positions (90), which I interpret to
mean that the change was responsive to the electorate’s wishes.  Independently from
Poole and Rosenthal and their roll-call data, Fogel (1989, 321) identifies the Congress of
1851-1852 as a period of transition.  The political agenda of the prior decades was
obsolete and a new agenda was yet to emerge.  That Congress was split into a multiplicity
of factional groupings who only occasionally coalesced – neither party nor section was
influential.  The primary political issues in 1851-1854 were local, responses to the
turmoil of mass immigration, urbanization, and early industrialization in the North.
Poole and Rosenthal also trace the history of roll-call votes on slavery issues (91-
100).  In the first 14 Congresses there were only 43 roll-call votes on the issue and only
weak party or sectional patterns.  Almost three-fourths of the roll-call votes on slavery
between 1817 and 1831 took place in the 15th (1817-1818) and 16th (1819-1820)
Congresses.  Historians call this the Era of Good Feelings; controversy over foreign wars
had died away, the Jeffersonian-Republicans had adopted some of the Federalists’
economic policies, because of the demise of the Federalists there was no partisan divide,
and President James Monroe was reelected in 1820 with only one symbolic vote opposed
in the electoral college.  The Missouri controversy played out in 1819 and 1820, and
slavery votes fit well into one dimension (indeed is the only issue with a high degree of
fit), but otherwise the spatial model is quite weak in this period, the 17th Congress (1821-
1822) being the worst-fitting to the model in American history.  Poole and Rosenthal
state that the collapse of the party system during the Era of Good Feelings “did not occur
because slavery was the new, destabilizing dimension” (1997, 95).  The collapse of the
first, Republican and Federalist, party system came about because the foreign-policy and
economic issues that structured it were no longer of importance.  Slavery rose as a
Congressional issue with the Missouri controversy but fell with the Missouri
Compromise.  The second, Democrat and Whig, party system arose along an economic
dimension but slavery never completely vanished as an issue, according to Poole and
Rosenthal.  The bulk of slavery votes came after 1835, they say, and slavery voting fell
increasingly along a second dimension.  “By 1853, this economic dimension collapsed
and was replaced by the slavery dimension” (95).  I suggest rather that after 1853 the
slavery dimension merged with the economic dimension.  What attraction did the
Democratic Party hold for the northern agrarians?  Originally, they were drawn to the
Jacksonian coalition because it promised greater democratic equality and liberty (for
white males) than did the aristocratic commercialists (see Fogel 1989, 316-319).
Democrats advocated territorial expansion and the cheap sale of federal land to promote
those values, Whigs opposed territorial expansion and advocated that federal land be sold
at high prices in order not to depress the price of the land they owned or inflate the price
of the labor they controlled.  During the Congress of 1853-1854 the Democrats
abandoned their defining cheap-land policy because their southern wing had concluded
that it politically advantaged the North.  In the same Congress the Democrats abrogated
the boundary of the Missouri Compromise, and thereafter slave settlers and free settlers
clashed in the territory of Kansas.  Meanwhile, over the objections of some of its
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formerly Whig members, the Republican Party took up the cause of cheap land.
Northern agrarians were drawn to the new party that promoted their democratic equality
and liberty, the Republicans.
Poole and Rosenthal’s findings suggest that tensions over slavery increased over a
long period, that the realignment within Congress was sudden, and the realignment was
initiated well before the Republican Party became a force in politics (99).  I interpret
Poole and Rosenthal’s data to mean that there was not a common multidimensional issue
space from 1800 to 1860 and thus that variations in political outcome from 1800 to 1860
were not due to the arbitrary manipulation of that space by political conspirators.  Poole
and Rosenthal show clearly that there was a strong party dimension and a weak sectional
dimension and that by 1853 the sectional dimension became strong and in its wake
restructured the parties along sectional lines.  It was not, however, the Slave Power
Conspiracy nor the Black Republicans (phrases of the respective sectional conspiracy
theorists) who brought about the realignment, rather it was changes in the preferences of
the political population.  “By the 1850s, slavery was not a new issue but a very old one
that had become more intense in both the North and the South” (emphasis added, 91).
Weingast (1998, 163) too holds that northern opposition to slavery increased over the
antebellum period.  According to Potter (1976, 38-41), during the colonial period there
was little difference between the sections concerning the morality of slavery, although
slavery was far more prevalent in the South.  The ideals of the Revolutionary War
inspired both North and South to condemn slavery as evil; emancipation and colonization
societies were as common in the Upper South as they were in the North.  But as the
profitable cotton economy expanded and slavery with it, the economic and ideological
center of the South shifted from Virginia  to South Carolina.  By 1832 the southern
antislavery movement had vanished and an ideology of slavery as a positive good had
arisen.  Meanwhile, slavery had been gradually abolished in the North.  Sectional opinion
on slavery further polarized in the 1840s and 1850s.
In short, the conventional hypothesis of preference change far better accounts for
developments in the antebellum period than Riker’s hypothesis of manipulation of
multiple dimensions by political elites.
Conclusion. The Arrow theorem disclosed the logical possibility of a majority
cycle, of perpetual political instability.  But we observe stability rather than instability in
democratic politics.  Riker (1958) initially responds that cycles are common but rarely
detected.  Simulations show and empirical studies corroborate, however, that cycling is
an empirical improbability.  Riker then concedes that uncontrived cycles are quite rare,
but that on major issues actors will contrive cycles by introduction of new alternatives.
Actors also engage in strategic voting, agenda control, and the introduction of new
dimensions in order to contrive multidimensional disequilibrium, according to Riker.
In order to be persuaded to abandon the concept of the public good and the idea of
democracy as in some sense the expression of the people’s will, most people would
require that it be robustly demonstrated that manipulation of outcomes be frequent,
harmful, and irremediable.  Riker’s position is that it is either theoretically impossible or
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empirically difficult to detect such manipulation.  He is able, however, to
produce spectacular anecdotes that show harmful manipulation on major issues, including
a demonstration that the biggest event in American history was the consequence of a
contrived cycle.  I have worked through each of his examples (Mackie 2000, an abridged
sample presented here), only to find that each is mistaken, and thus Riker’s case fails on
its own terms.  In summary, according to Mackie (2000), theoretical considerations about
the distribution of preference orders suggest that cycles are most unlikely; empirical
studies show that cycles are of no practical importance; finally, every developed and
published example of a political cycle has now been refuted.  Thus, after fifty years of
scholarship, from the first publication of Arrow’s theorem, no one has satisfactorily
demonstrated the existence of a normatively troubling cycle in the real world.  That
almost all the claims to demonstrate a cycle came from the pen of one man should have
served as a warning signal.
The antidemocratic interpretations of social choice results inspired by Riker,
widely endorsed in the discipline of political science, are unsupported by evidence and
must be abandoned.
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